Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness by Kriegel, Uriah
Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness 
Uriah Kriegel 
Forthcoming in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness 
 
 
Abstract. The centerpiece of the scientific study of consciousness is the 
search for the neural correlates of consciousness. Yet science is typically 
interested not only in discovering correlations, but also – and more 
deeply – in explaining them. When faced with a correlation between two 
phenomena in nature, we typically want to know why they correlate. The 
purpose of this chapter is twofold. The first half attempts to lay out the 
various possible explanations of the correlation between consciousness 
and its neural correlate – to provide a sort of “menu” of options from 
which we probably would ultimately have to choose. The second half 
raises considerations suggesting that, under certain reasonable 
assumptions, the choice among these various options may be in principle 
underdetermined by the relevant scientific evidence.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The centerpiece of the scientific study of consciousness is the search for the 
neural correlates of consciousness (Morales & Lau, this volume). Yet science is 
typically interested not only in correlation relations among natural phenomena, 
but also in causal and constitutive relations. Often, these causal and constitutive 
relations are posited as explanations of why certain phenomena correlate. To 
treat correlations as brute and inexplicable is to acquiesce in mysterious aspects 
of nature, somewhat as the spiritualist revels in “weird coincidences.” It is surely 
the mandate of intellectual inquiry in general and science in particular to address 
such coincidences and shed light on why they hold. 
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 Consider Leibniz’s “pre-established harmony theory” of the connection 
between mind and body (i.e., the hypothesis that at the beginning of time God 
established a correlation between the two, so that whenever certain changes 
occur in some creature’s brain activity, certain events will take place 
simultaneously in the creature’s stream of consciousness, and vice versa). In an 
obvious sense, this is an extremely anti-scientific approach to the correlation 
between consciousness and brain activity. Yet even this approach ventures some 
kind of explanation. It does not posit the correlation as brute and inexplicable. 
Instead, it offers a reason for the correlation. In so doing, it tries to make it 
intelligible. Insofar as the “brute correlation” approach we find in current 
scientific research on consciousness does not even attempt to do that, it might 
be claimed to be even more mysterian.  
 With this in mind, it is natural for us to hope that the current science of 
consciousness could offer more than just an identification of the neural correlate 
of consciousness – that it might offer an explanation of why the correlation 
holds. The purpose of the chapter is twofold. In the first half (§§1-2), I want to lay 
out the various possible explanations of the correlation between consciousness 
and its neural correlate. The idea is to provide a sort of “menu” of options from 
which we would probably have to choose – and to link it to traditional 
metaphysical positions on the problem of consciousness. In the chapter’s 
second half (§§3-4), however, I will raise considerations suggesting that, under 
certain reasonable assumptions, the choice among these various options may be 
in principle underdetermined by the relevant scientific evidence, so that the 
traditional metaphysical positions may be empirically equivalent. I should stress 
that I am not entirely persuaded that the claim is true; still, the considerations 
supporting it strike me as quite powerful and worth contending with. If it is true, 
however, then the choice between different explanations of phenomenal-
cerebral correlations cannot in principle be a scientific one. It must be a matter 
of philosophical-theory choice. 
 
1. Neural Correlates and Explanatory Hypotheses 
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It is widely thought that materialism and dualism about consciousness are both 
compatible with the eventual discovery of the neural correlates of consciousness 
(NCC). One way to think of this is in terms of what we can infer from a 
correlation. Suppose, purely for the sake of exposition, that the NCC is neural 
synchronization with above-baseline activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC) (Lau and Passingham 2006, Kriegel 2009 Ch.7, Rounis et al. 2010). Often 
– though, of course, not always – correlation is an indicator of causation. When 
we notice a correlation between the striking of matches and their lighting up, we 
infer that striking a match causes it to light. This is a fairly standard form of so-
called inference to the best explanation, arguably the central mode of scientific 
inference (Harman 1965, Lipton 1992). The reasoning proceeds as follows:  
1) Match-striking correlates with match-lighting; 
2) The best explanation of this is that match-striking causes match-lighting; 
therefore, plausibly, 
3) Match-striking causes match-lighting. 
In a similar vein, we might infer from the correlation between neural 
synchronization with dlPFC activity and consciousness that synchronization with 
dlPFC activity causes consciousness – that this particular neural activity brings 
about, is responsible for the production of, consciousness. More generally, the 
reasoning is this: 
1) The NCC correlates with consciousness; 
2) The best explanation of this is that the NCC causes consciousness; 
therefore, plausibly, 
3) The NCC causes consciousness. 
This is often the most natural explanatory hypothesis for the correlation between 
two phenomena: that one is simply the cause of the other. 
 As is well known, however, the direction of causation is often in question 
when explanatory inferences are performed. The largest concentration of 
asthmatics in the US lives in Tucson, Arizona, despite the fact that the Sonora 
desert’s extraordinarily dry air is supposed to help with asthma. Obviously, the 
explanation of this tight correlation between dry air and incidence of asthma is 
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not that Tucson’s dry air causes people to develop asthma. On the contrary, it is 
that sufficiently severe asthma causes people to relocate to Tucson. By the same 
token, a perfectly coherent possibility is that synchronization with dlPFC activity 
is not so much the cause of consciousness as its effect.  In this picture, there is a 
sort of ‘downward causation’ by which consciousness alters the state of the 
brain, a downward causation characteristic of what Chalmers (2002) calls “type-D 
dualism.”1 It is thus epistemically possible to pursue the following piece of 
reasoning: 
1) The NCC correlates with consciousness; 
2) The best explanation of this is that consciousness causes the NCC; 
therefore, plausibly, 
3) consciousness causes the NCC. 
The difference between this “reverse causal hypothesis” and the “more 
straightforward” causal explanation concerns what causal direction is taken to 
better explain the correlation between consciousness and the NCC. In this 
section I do not comment on the question of the possible hypotheses’ relative 
merits; my goal is merely to set out the menu of options.  
A further option, when faced with a correlation between two phenomena, 
is to maintain that there is a third cause responsible for the occurrence of each 
phenomenon independently – and thus responsible for their correlation. The 
correlation between lightning and thunder, for example, is best explained 
neither by the hypothesis that lightning causes thunder nor by the hypothesis 
that thunder causes lightning. Rather, there is a third element that causes both: 
the collision of ice and water particles inside a cloud causes lightning, on the 
one hand, and thunder, on the other. Since it causes both, it also causes their 
correlation. Likewise, one might hold that some third factor might cause the 
occurrence of the NCC, on the one hand, and consciousness, on the other. Here 
the general explanatory inference looks like this: 
1) The NCC correlates with consciousness; 
2) The best explanation of this is that there is some third element that 
causes both the NCC and consciousness; therefore, plausibly, 
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3) There is some third element that causes both the NCC and 
consciousness. 
In itself, this explanatory inference is neutral on what the third cause is – what 
the “X factor” is. This means that there are as many versions of this inference as 
there are potential X factors. One way to understand “quantum-mechanical 
approaches” to consciousness (e.g., Hameroff and Penrose 1996) might be a 
version of the above causal inference. The thesis is that certain quantum-
mechanical events cause both changes in the brain and changes in 
consciousness, thus accounting for the correlation between the two. Another 
version is of course Leibniz’s pre-established harmony theory, where God’s will 
acts as the third cause.  
 Sometimes causal hypotheses are not the best explanations of correlation 
at all. There is a tight correlation between lifting something out of a shop and 
breaking the law. But this is not because shoplifting causes lawbreaking, but 
because shoplifting is lawbreaking. We may say that the relation between 
shoplifting and lawbreaking is not causal but constitutive: shoplifting constitutes 
breaking the law. In this case, the shoplifting breaks the law by definition rather 
than by causation. But arguably, there are cases where a constitutive hypothesis 
explains correlation better than a causal hypothesis even where no definitions 
are involved. When scientists first observed the remarkable correlation between 
water and the molecular structure known as H2O, they did not infer that H2O 
must cause water; instead, they inferred that H2O must be water – that there is 
nothing more to water over and above H2O. That is, large enough collections of 
H2O molecules constitutes bodies of water. Here the inference is from 
correlation to constitution. The same reasoning can be applied to the correlation 
between consciousness and the NCC (see Hohwy 2011): 
1) The NCC correlates with consciousness; 
2) The best explanation of this is that the NCC constitutes consciousness; 
therefore, plausibly, 
3) The NCC constitutes consciousness. 
There is thus a competition between two interpretations of the correlation 
between consciousness and its neural correlate: a causal interpretation and a 
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constitutive interpretation. It is the latter that characterizes physicalist theories of 
consciousness (see Jackson, this volume).  
Moreover, just as the causal interpretation admits of two opposing 
“directions” – the NCC causes consciousness and consciousness causes the 
NCC – so the constitutive interpretation does. In addition to the above 
constitutive hypothesis, the opposing hypothesis according to which neural 
structures are themselves ultimately constituted by consciousness is coherent as 
well. This is, in effect, the view of idealists, such as Michael Pelczar (2015, this 
volume), who maintain that ultimate reality is in fact phenomenal. Here the 
reasoning proceeds as follows: 
1) The NCC correlates with consciousness; 
2) The best explanation of this is that consciousness constitutes the NCC; 
therefore, plausibly, 
3) Consciousness constitutes the NCC. 
This reasoning may also be taken to characterize the view of certain 
panpsychists, such as Greg Rosenberg (2005), who hold that some phenomenal 
properties underlie all physical properties. 
Likewise, corresponding to the “third cause” explanatory hypothesis 
there is certainly the option of a third constitutor hypothesis. That is, there might 
be an “X factor” that in one manifestation (perhaps in combination with some 
micro-properties) constitutes the NCC and in another (with other properties) 
constitutes consciousness. Here the reasoning is: 
1) The NCC correlates with consciousness; 
2) The best explanation of this is that there is some third element that 
constitutes both the NCC and consciousness; therefore, plausibly, 
3) There is some third element that constitutes both the NCC and 
consciousness. 
As we will see below, certain versions of “neutral monism,” a view that goes 
back at least to Spinoza, are in effect committed to such a third-constitutor view 
(see Coleman & Goff, this volume).  
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 In summary, I have presented six possible explanations, or 
interpretations, of the correlation between consciousness and whatever turns 
out to be its neural correlate (e.g., synchronization with dlPFC). These are: 
1) CAUSATION: consciousness is caused by the NCC. 
2) REVERSE CAUSATION: the NCC is caused by consciousness. 
3) THIRD CAUSE: consciousness and the NCC are both caused by some third 
element. 
4) CONSTITUTION: consciousness is constituted by the NCC. 
5) REVERSE CONSTITUTION: the NCC is constituted by consciousness. 
6) THIRD CONSTITUTOR: consciousness and the NCC  are both constituted by 
some third element.  
In the next section, I link this menu to contemporary philosophical theories 
about the mind-body problem.  
 
2. Explanatory Hypotheses and Metaphysical Positions 
 
Of the six explanatory hypotheses just laid out, the most important may well be 
CAUSATION and CONSTITUTION. For something like it appears to mark the crucial 
disagreement between moderate forms of materialism and moderate forms of 
dualism. There are radical forms of materialism according to which 
consciousness does not exist (see Irvine & Sprevak, this volume), and therefore 
has no correlates, as well as radical forms of dualism according to which 
conscious activity unfolds in complete freedom from brain activity. We may call 
these eliminative materialism and non-naturalistic dualism. In modern 
philosophy of mind, non-eliminative forms of materialism and naturalistic forms 
of dualism are the more dominant views. Both agree that conscious activity 
depends in some way on brain activity. The disagreement concerns the type of 
dependence involved. For the materialist, consciousness depends ontologically, 
metaphysically, or constitutively, on brain activity. For the dualist, the 
dependence is merely “natural,” nomological, or causal.  
 There are many different ways to try to capture this difference more 
precisely. In late twentieth-century philosophy of mind, the notion of 
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supervenience played a crucial role in this area.  In particular, the distinction 
between (non-eliminative) materialism and (naturalist) dualism was taken to 
come down to the choice between metaphysical and merely nomological 
supervenience (Chalmers 1996). Roughly, the idea is that for the materialist, in 
no metaphysically possible world could there be variation in conscious activity 
without corresponding variation in brain activity, whereas for the dualist, this 
could happen in some metaphysically possible world, though not in any 
nomologically possible world (i.e., in any world that has the same laws of nature 
as the actual world).  
 In more recent philosophy of mind, the notion of supervenience is often 
taken to point at a mere formal symptom of underlying substantive connections 
between the supervenient and the subvenient. We might distinguish between 
“metaphysical grounding” and “natural grounding” as the two substantive 
connections underlying metaphysical and nomological supervenience; in which 
case (non-eliminative materialism) would claim that consciousness is 
metaphysically grounded in the NCC whereas (naturalistic) dualism would claim 
that consciousness is naturally grounded in the NCC. Alternatively, we might call 
“grounding” the connection whose diagnostic symptom is metaphysical 
supervenience and “emergence” the connection whose diagnostic symptom is 
nomological supervenience; in which case materialism would claim that 
consciousness is grounded in the NCC whereas dualism would claim that 
consciousness merely emerges from the NCC.  
 However we mark this difference, the distinction between causal and 
constitutive connections seems to go to the core of the distinction. The notion 
that a conscious state is constituted by its neural correlate is of a piece with the 
ideas that the former is grounded in, or metaphysically supervenes upon, the 
latter. The notion that a conscious state is caused by its neural correlate is of a 
piece with the ideas that the former emerges from, or nomologically supervenes 
upon, the latter. Indeed, a constitutive connection would presumably have 
metaphysical supervenience for a symptom and a causal connection would 
presumably have nomological supervenience for a symptom (since causation 
certainly obeys the principle “same causes, same effects”).  Thus we may take 
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CONSTITUTION and CAUSATION to capture the key difference between non-
eliminative materialism and naturalistic dualism.  
 As for non-naturalistic dualism, it can play out in two very different ways. 
The first is that there is no correlation whatsoever between consciousness and 
the NCC. This view can be seen as making the prediction that the scientific 
search for the NCC will end with failure. The second option, however, is that 
although conscious activity unfolds in complete freedom from brain activity, the 
opposite does not hold, perhaps because with REVERSE CAUSATION is true: 
conscious activity casually determines what the neural process our brain 
undergoes. Both views, to repeat, are non-naturalistic forms of dualism. They do 
not represent a significant background positions on the mind-body problem in 
contemporary philosophy and cognitive science. I am airing them here just for 
the sake of completeness.  
 In the same vein, we may note that REVERSE CONSTITUTION is a very natural 
development of traditional idealism. Some care is needed here, however. Some 
idealists, such as Berkeley, hold that the physical does not exist – nothing is 
physical (Berkeley 1710). A fortiori, then, there are no brains and no neural 
processes. Accordingly, there is neural correlate of consciousness. All there is is 
consciousness. This is to be distinguished from the view, perhaps Plato’s and/or 
Leibniz’s, that the physical does exist but is ultimately constituted by the 
phenomenal. We may distinguish the two views by calling the former view 
eliminative idealism and the latter non-eliminative idealism. Now, while 
eliminative idealism denies the existence of phenomenal–neural correlations 
(just as eliminative materialism does), non-eliminative materialism appears to be 
committed to REVERSE CONSTITUTION. 
What about THIRD CAUSE and THIRD CONSTITUTOR? The latter fits rather 
naturally with certain forms of Russellian monism, namely, those that posit 
fundamental properties of the universe that are neither phenomenal nor physical 
but at the same time are both proto-phenomenal and proto-physical: some 
combinations or aggregates of them somehow constitute phenomenal 
properties, others somehow constitute physical properties (including neural 
properties). If this is one’s view of the ultimate connection between the 
 10 
consciousness and brain activity, then one takes there to be a third type of 
ingredient in the universe that constitutively underlies both consciousness and 
its correlated neural processes. That is, one is committed to THIRD CONSTITUTOR. 
Now, there are also forms of version of Russellian monism in which the proto-
physical properties are taken to be phenomenal rather than proto-phenomenal 
properties. Those versions are rather committed to REVERSE CAUSATION, and 
essentially collapse into non-eliminative idealism.  
Insofar as THIRD CONSTITUTOR is a kind of Russellian monism, we could 
think of THIRD CAUSE as corresponding to a kind of “Russellian dualism.” The 
idea is that there is some third type of property, neither phenomenal nor 
physical, different combinations of which somehow causally bring about 
instantiations of phenomenal properties and instantiations of physical 
properties. As noted, quantum theories of consciousness may be seen to be 
committed to something like this.  
Thus we can map the six explanatory hypotheses laid out at the end of 
the previous section onto six metaphysical positions on the ultimate connection 
between phenomenal and neural properties: CAUSATION corresponds to 
naturalistic dualism; REVERSE CAUSATION corresponds to (some versions of) non-
naturalistic dualism; THIRD CAUSE corresponds to certain quantum theories; 
CONSTITUTION corresponds to non-eliminative materialism; REVERSE CONSTITUTION 
corresponds to non-eliminative idealism; THIRD CONSTITUTOR corresponds to 
(certain versions of) Russellian monism. What this suggests is that many of the 
competing metaphysical positions on the mind-body problem can be paired 
with specific interpretations of the correlation between consciousness and the 
NCC.2  
In this way, our sixfold scheme allows us to see how the choice among 
various metaphysical positions on the problem of consciousness reduces to a 
choice among different explanatory hypotheses regarding the correlation 
between consciousness and its NCC. It allows us to reframe the philosophical 
problem of consciousness as the following question: Which is the best 
explanatory inference to make from the correlation between consciousness and 
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the NCC? Which offers the most plausible explanatory hypothesis about why 
this correlation exists?  
 
3. Explanatory Hypotheses and Empirical Equivalence 
 
How should we go about choosing among the options before us? In general, 
choosing among alternative explanatory hypotheses is based on two kinds of 
consideration. First, there is the question of empirical adequacy: which of the 
competing hypotheses accommodates the empirical data best. Secondly, there 
is the question of theoretical adequacy: which of the competing hypotheses 
scores highest with respect to the theoretical (or “superempirical”) virtues, such 
as simplicity, parsimony, conservatism, modesty, cohesion/coherence, unity, 
elegance, fecundity, testability, and so on (see Quine and Ullian 1970). In this 
section, I want to raise the epistemic possibility that at least CONSTITUTION and 
CAUSATION – arguably, the two leading explanatory hypotheses in our scheme – 
may be empirically equivalent, in the sense of being exactly equal in empirical 
adequacy. In the next section I will briefly consider the consequences such 
empirical equivalence would have for the choice between them.  
 In trying to pull CAUSATION and CONSTITUTION apart experimentally, the 
first order of business should be to seek empirical symptoms of the difference 
between causal and constitutive relations in general – in the hope that we might 
be able to exploit these in the present context as well. There are two main 
empirical symptoms of the causal/constitutive difference: one has to do with 
time lag, the other with mediating mechanism. The hope is that at least one of 
these could help us produce discordant predictions out of CAUSATION and 
CONSTITUTION.  
Let us start with the issue of time lag. It is plausible to suppose that, while 
there is always a time lag between cause and effect (the former precedes the 
latter), constitutor and constitutee (if you will) are always simultaneous. Thus, the 
presence of H2O in some location does not precede the presence of water, but 
the striking of a match does precede its lighting up. Of course, like everything 
else in philosophy, the temporal lag between cause and effect has been 
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contested (Huemer and Kovitz 2003). If there is no temporal lap between cause 
and effect, then temporal considerations will offer no empirical symptom of the 
difference between causal and constitutive connection. Let us grant for the sake 
of argument, however, that causes do precede their effects, whereas 
constitutors do not precede their constitutees. Applied to the choice between 
CAUSATION and CONSTITUTION, we might suppose that if the NCC is causally 
connected to consciousness, then its occurrence will precede the onset of 
consciousness ever so slightly, whereas if it is constitutively connected to 
consciousness, it will be strictly simultaneous therewith. This is one empirical 
symptom of the difference between causal and constitutive connections. 
As for mechanism, causal connections are typically mediated by a 
mechanism, whereas constitutive connections are not. Thus, when investigating 
the connection between match-striking and match-lighting, it is possible to “go 
deeper” and discover the mechanism that mediates the causing of the latter by 
the former. Typically, this means exposing a series of intermediary causal 
transactions at a more fundamental level of reality – in this case, chemical 
interactions involving sulfur, phosphorus, oxygen, and so on. In general, when A 
causes B, it is often the case that this is mediated through a series of finer-
grained causal transactions – A causes E1, E1 causes E2, E2 causes E3, … , En-1 
causes En, and En causes B. The only exception to the existence of a mediating 
mechanism concerns causal transactions at the “bottom level” of reality, which 
must be brute and unmediated, since we cannot “go deeper” and seek even 
more fundamental transactions mediating them. (More on that presently.) In 
contrast with all this, when A constitutes B, such that B is nothing but A, there is 
no expectation that there be “intermediate stages” of “nothing-but-ness.” For A 
to constitute B, it is not necessary that there be some series X1 … Xn such that A 
constitutes X1, X1 causes X2, … , Xn-1 causes Xn, and Xn constitutes B. 
Accordingly, to choose between CAUSATION and CONSTITUTION, we might seek a 
series of intermediary correlates between consciousness and the NCC. If such a 
series can be found, however short, this could indicate a causal connection 
between the two. If none can be found (despite sustained attempts to reveal 
one), that could indicate a constitutive connection.  
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 Unfortunately, I think both of these empirical symptoms of the 
causal/constitutive distinction – temporal lag and mediating mechanism – face 
outstanding challenges when applied to the case of consciousness and the 
NCC. These challenges make it unlikely that they can help us discriminate 
between CAUSATION and CONSTITUTION.  
When it comes to temporal lag, there is of course the problem that no 
technology we can envisage at present has the sort of temporal resolution 
necessary to tell apart the difference between exact simultaneity and slight 
precedence at the time scales with which we are concerned here. (Certainly fMRI 
and EEG do not, but nor does optical imaging.3) More importantly, there are at 
least two more principled problems with appeal to temporal lag in the present 
context.  
An initial problem is this. Imagine a time lag characteristic of the relevant 
kind of causal transaction – a lag between times t1 and t2. Imagine also that at t1 
the neural state N1 occurs and the phenomenal state P1 does, and that at t2 
neural state N2 occurs and phenomenal state P2 does. Here there are both 
materialist/constitutive and dualist/causal hypotheses regarding the neural 
correlate of P2. The materialist hypothesis is that the neural correlate of P2 is N2, 
which is simultaneous with P2 and indeed constitutes it. The dualist hypothesis is 
that the neural correlate of P2 is N1, which precedes it, because it is its cause. At 
the time scales we are talking about, P2 is likely to be systematically correlated 
across different contexts with both N1 and N2.4 
The same point applies to the very onset of consciousness. Suppose two 
mental states M1 and M2 occur at t1 and t2, such that M2 is phenomenally 
conscious but M1 is not. Suppose also that N1 is a neural state exactly 
contemporaneous with M1 and N2 a neural state exactly contemporaneous with 
M2. Again, we can hypothesize that N1 is the neural correlate of M2, hence a 
cause of consciousness, or that N2 is the neural correlate of M2, hence a 
constitutor of consciousness. Both hypotheses accommodate the timed 
observations of N1, N2, M1, and M2.  
There is a further problem, which may be tougher yet. When trying to 
pinpoint the exact time of two kinds of event, with an eye to comparing these 
 14 
times, it is crucial that we know how much time the measuring instruments take 
to produce their timing verdicts. Otherwise, there will be an irresolvable 
confound. If a time lag is detected between A and B, all we know immediately is 
that the detecting of A preceded the detecting of B. This is consistent with both 
(a) A really preceding B and (b) A and B being simultaneous but the detecting of 
B taking longer than the detecting of A. The only way to remove this confound 
is by having an independent measure of the time it takes each instrument to 
time its target. Ideally, this problem would be bypassed by using the very same 
measuring tool for both, or at least overcome by using measuring tools that 
demonstrably take the same amount of time to do the measuring. Clearly, 
however, in the present case this ideal set-up is unavailable: the timing of 
conscious states must ultimately rely on introspection, since introspection is our 
only direct access to conscious states, whereas the timing of neural states 
cannot use introspection, since introspection affords us no access to neural 
states.5 Sub-ideally, then, we might use two different measuring instruments and 
find an independent way to measure the time it takes each measuring 
instrument to detect its target, subtracting this time to identify the likely time of 
occurrence of the target event. This approach may apply well to the timing of 
neural states: measuring the time it takes a measuring instrument to time the 
occurrence of a neural event may be fairly straightforward in principle (if 
technically challenging in practice). The real problem with the approach, 
however, is that when it comes to the timing of conscious states by 
introspection, the approach becomes circular, since introspective states are 
themselves conscious. We can imagine a future in which we have fully specified 
the neural mechanisms subserving introspection, and where we have measured 
precisely the time it takes for information to “travel up” to the “introspection 
center” and trigger the neural state underlying the introspective state. But 
unless we know whether there is a further bit of travel to be done, because that 
neural state merely causes the introspective state, or the travelling is finished, 
because the neural state constitutes the introspective state, we cannot be 
certain of the exact time it takes to introspectively detect that which is 
introspected.  
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If all this is correct, we are bound to remain stuck with our confound, and 
therefore with two empirically indistinguishable interpretations of any time lag 
between the detecting of the NCC and the detecting of consciousness.6 Bearing 
in mind Wittgenstein’s alleged remark that it is nonsense to suppose that 
humans will some day walk on the moon, and adopting in consequence a more 
diffident cast of mind toward the deliverances of armchair reasoning, I hesitate 
to rule out a priori the idea of a future time in which the timing of corresponding 
neural and conscious states has been established, in a way as yet elusive to our 
imagination, and is used to empirically distinguish CAUSATION and CONSTITUTION. 
Nonetheless, the above challenge to the very possibility of such a future looms 
large.  
So much for using temporal lags to empirically distinguish causal and 
constitutive hypotheses. What about mediating mechanism? The idea was that 
causal transactions are mediated by mechanisms involving finer-grained causal 
transactions, whereas constitutive connections are not normally mediated by a 
series of finer-grained constitutions. Recall, however, that there was an 
exception to the rule that causal transactions are mediated by finer-grained 
transactions. The exception was causal transactions at the fundamental level of 
reality. At the bottom level of reality, there are no finer-grained causal 
transactions for us to seek. We must treat such transactions as metaphysically 
brute and ungrounded – somewhat as we treat the gravitational constant, the 
Avogadro constant, and other fundamental physical constants. Nothing 
underlies the fact that the gravitational constant is approximately 
6.673×10−11 N·(m/kg)2, and likewise nothing underlies the causal process by 
which a lepton absorbs a boson and converts into a neutrino. There are causal 
laws governing such causal transactions, but there are no finer-grained 
transactions mediating them. The problem this presents in the present context is 
that according to mainstream versions of naturalistic dualism, consciousness 
occurs precisely at the fundamental level of reality, where no mediating 
mechanism is to be found. If so, the fact that CONSTITUTION does not make room 
for a mediating mechanism linking the NCC and consciousness does not 
distinguish it from CAUSATION. 
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Consider Chalmers’ (1996) version of naturalistic dualism. Chalmers 
reasons that since dualists, unlike materialists, hold that phenomenal properties 
are irreducible to any microphysical properties (or any other fundamental 
properties there might be), they must posit phenomenal properties as 
fundamental. If charm and spin are fundamental, then phenomenal 
consciousness must be construed as belonging at the same level of reality as 
charm and spin – the “bottom level.” This means that any causal transactions 
between microphysical events and phenomenal events are effectively 
transactions at the “bottom level” of reality. That, in turn, means that there will 
be no more fundamental transactions mediating them – no mechanism 
connecting cause and effect. In consequence, the materialist’s CONSTITUTION and 
the naturalistic dualist’s CAUSATION make the exact same prediction here: that 
there will be no “intermediate correlates” between consciousness and the NCC, 
or more accurately between consciousness and the microphysical processes that 
constitute the NCC. Since they make the same prediction, they are empirically 
equivalent on this score.  
There may be some other empirical symptoms of the difference between 
causation and constitution, other than temporal lag and mediating mechanism. 
But for my part, I cannot think of any. It would certainly be of great value to 
identify such potential empirical symptoms. Unless we can do so, we may have 
to acquiesce in the empirical indistinguishability of CONSTITUTION and CAUSATION, 
hence of non-eliminative materialism and naturalistic dualism.  
 
4. Empirical Equivalence and the Science of Consciousness 
 
As noted, in addition to empirical adequacy, scientific theories are also assessed 
for their theoretical adequacy. One could therefore suggest that CAUSATION and 
CONSTITUTION may yet be evaluated and compared with respect to the 
superempirical virtues. Certainly parsimony seems to tell in favor of 
CONSTITUTION, or materialism more generally, since 1 < 2 (see Smart 1959)… 
This approach raises a number of difficulties, however. 
 17 
First, when two theories are perfectly empirically equivalent, there is an 
important sense in which choosing among them on the basis of superempirical 
virtues is a nonscientific endeavor. Doctoral students and postdocs in cognitive 
neuroscience laboratories are trained by their advisors in the designing and 
carrying out of experiments, not in the judicious comparison of experimentally 
indistinguishable hypotheses along superempirical dimensions. 
 More deeply, there is an ongoing debate in philosophy of science about 
the proper doxastic attitude toward the superempirical or theoretical virtues (see 
van Fraassen 1980, Churchland 1982). Consider simplicity. It is intuitive that 
mutatis mutandis we should always prefer simpler theories to more complicated 
ones. It is thus natural to count the simplicity of a theory as a reason for 
believing it. However, it is not obvious why the simplicity of a theory counts in its 
favor. In particular, it is very unclear why, indeed whether, a theory’s simplicity 
means that it is more likely to be true. As van Fraassen (1980: 90) puts it, “it is 
surely absurd to think that the world is more likely to be simple than 
complicated.”  
Several philosophical ideas underlie this challenge to understanding the 
status of simplicity in theory evaluation. One idea is that ultimately, the only 
reason to believe a theory is that the theory is likely to be true. We may decide 
to adopt a theory, for pragmatic, aesthetic, or other reasons. But that is not 
quite the same as believing a theory. To believe a theory is to adopt it for 
epistemic reasons, more specifically for the reason that we think it likely to be 
true. Second, what makes a theory true is that it represents correctly the way the 
world is. Accordingly, for a theory to be more likely to come out true, it must be 
more likely that it represents the world the way it really is. Third, we do not 
actually have an independent handle on the objective degree of nature’s 
complexity, in a way that would allow us to compare the complexity of nature 
and the complexity of theories that purport to describe it. If we take on board all 
three ideas, it would seem that simplicity is not a reason to believe a scientific 
theory – though it may well be a reason to adopt it on some non-epistemic 
grounds (i.e., for the sake of other purposes than knowing how the world is).  
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The worry is that this kind of reasoning may generalize to the other 
central theoretical virtues, especially parsimony and unity. We do not have some 
independent grip on the cosmos’ degree of unity, one that suggests the cosmos 
is so inherently unified that the more unified our theory of it, the more likely the 
theory is to represent the world correctly. Likewise, we do not have an 
independent handle on the number of entities in the world that recommends 
keeping the number of posits in our theory thereof to a minimum. Thus 
whatever the force of unity and parsimony – and it is an open question both 
what that force exactly is and what is it based on – it cannot be due to their 
augmenting a theory’s likely truth (i.e., the likelihood that it represents the world 
the way it really is). One way to put the challenge is that the theoretical virtues 
may not be truth-conducive: that a theory T exhibits the theoretical virtues does 
not make it more likely that T correctly represents the way things are (Beebe 
2009, Kriegel 2013). 
It might be objected that parsimony reasoning is often used in scientific 
theory building in what appears to be a truth-conducive way (Sober 2009). 
Consider this piece of reasoning from evolutionary biology: both humans and 
monkeys have tailbones; if humans and monkeys have no common ancestry, the 
tailbone would have had to originate twice; if they have common ancestry, it 
only had to originate once; the latter hypothesis is thus more parsimonious than 
the former, and more likely to be true. The idea here is that the occurrence of 
two independent events is less probable than the occurrence of one (other 
things being equal). Suppose the probability of E1 occurring is 70% and that of 
E2 is 50%. Then the probability of both occurring is 35% – lower than either. 
Accordingly, the single-event hypothesis is more probable than the dual-event 
one. So parsimony tracks likely truth.  
Observe, however, that the kind of parsimony invoked here is not the 
kind invoked by materialism and CONSTITUTION. Both evolutionary hypotheses 
under consideration posit the same types of entity – humans, monkeys, 
tailbones, originations. They only differ on the distribution of those entity types: 
one posits one token event where the other posits two tokens. Thus the two 
hypotheses differ in what we might call token-parsimony, but are equal in type-
parsimony: they differ in the number of token tailbone-origination events they 
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posit, but both are ontologically committed to tailbones, originations, and 
indeed tailbone-originations. In contrast, materialism and dualism differ in type-
parsimony: they disagree on the kinds of things there are in the world.7 The 
point is: while it is clear how token-parsimony can be truth-conducive, it is much 
more mysterious how type-parsimony might be. Yet it is the latter that separates 
CAUSATION and CONSTITUTION. 
 If all this is right, then there may be no epistemic grounds for preferring 
CAUSATION or CONSTITUTION, qua scientific hypotheses about the relationship 
between consciousness and its neural correlate. On the one hand, there appear 
to be no way to experimentally disentangle them. On the other, the theoretical 
virtues do not seem to apply to them in a way that renders one more likely to be 
true than the other. As already noted, it may well be that our present difficulties 
in envisaging an experimental test that could separate predictions by CAUSATION 
and CONSTITUTION are but failures of imagination. It is also possible, of course, 
that a demonstration of the truth-conduciveness of (some) superempirical virtues 
will emerge at some point. Still, the considerations above do cast a worrisome 
shadow over the hope for a scientific resolution of the dualism/materialism 
debate. If so, the right attitude may be to withhold scientific judgment on 
whether CAUSATION or CONSTITUTION (or one of the other four hypotheses 
formulated in §1) is most likely to be true. 
This line of reasoning is in some ways disappointing. But in other ways, it 
may be thought liberating. The problem of consciousness has led many 
scientists to ignore consciousness as an improper subject of scientific 
investigation. Some have even been led to deny the existence of consciousness, 
more or less to protect the Enlightenment notion that science can account for 
every aspect of reality. Others have admitted the existence of consciousness and 
refused to ignore it, but there is a stubborn sense that they nonetheless have 
deflated somewhat the phenomenon, turning it into a purely functional 
phenomenon thin on intrinsic subjective character. The above reflections 
recommend a humbler approach that relinquishes the mentioned Enlightenment 
ideal and concedes that we may be unable in principle to reach a scientific 
resolution of the problem of consciousness. There may be principled 
methodological and epistemological reasons why we cannot choose among the 
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various possible explanations of the correlation between consciousness and the 
NCC. Indeed, the above reflections may be seen to offer a diagnosis of the 
elusiveness of scientific progress on the ultimate question of consciousness’ 
place in nature.8 
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1 At this point, I do not wish to comment on the plausibility of this view. The present 
discussion is intended merely to lay out the possible explanations. 
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2 Note, though, that our sixfold distinction is not exhaustive of the logical landscape on 
the mind-body problem. It notably leaves out eliminative materialism and eliminative 
idealism. It also fails to make certain distinctions, e.g. between reductive and non-
reductive materialism and between epiphenomenalist and downward-causation 
versions of dualism. 
 
3 On optical imaging and its resolution, see Graton et al. 2003. 
 
4 The problem would be solved if we could somehow “observe” not only both 
correlates, but also the actual connection between them. But it is widely held that the 
connection between cause and effect is unobservable (and presumably so is the 
connection between constitutor and constitute). 
 
5 This too has been contested by some philosophers. For example, Churchland (1979) 
claims that with better (more scientifically based) primary and secondary education, 
future generations of humans will learn to introspect their conscious life in neural terms. 
I am going to assume here that this is false. 
 
6 The confound, to repeat, is this. Suppose we detect consciousness and the NCC, and 
the detecting of the latter suitably precedes the detecting of the former. One 
interpretation of this time lag between the two detections is that there was a real time 
lag between the NCC and consciousness. The other is that there was no time lag 
between consciousness and the NCC and the lag between their detections is due 
entirely to the different speeds of operation of our timing devices. The specter I am 
raising here is that there is no way to experimentally pull apart these two 
interpretations. (Conversely, suppose we find no time lag between the detecting of the 
NCC and the detecting of consciousness. This too is consistent with at least two 
interpretations. One is that the two are simultaneous. The other is that the NCC 
precedes consciousness but its precedence is masked by a compensatory difference in 
the speed of timing consciousness and timing the NCC.) 
 
7 Furthermore, the dualist does not posit her two types of property – physical and 
phenomenal – to explain a single explanandum (as is the case with the tailbones). 
Rather, she posits the physical brain property to explain neurological data or third-
person overt behavior, but phenomenal properties to explain our introspective 
impressions or first-person grasp on our mental life. 
 
8 I would like to thank David Chalmers, Jakob Hohwy, Benji Kozuch, and Farid Masrour 
for comments on a previous draft, and Benji Kozuch and Rachel Schneebaum for useful 
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